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USING NEPA TO EXCLUDE THE POOR 
By Carolyn Daffron * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 (NEPA) I directs federal agencies to prepare detailed docu-
ments (called Environmental Impact Statements or EIS) describing 
the anticipated environmental effects of all "major federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." In 
1973 a group of Chicago residents, the Nucleus of Chicago Home-
owners Association (NO-CHA) sued the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) and the Chicago Housing Author-
ity (CHA) to enjoin construction of a public housing project in their 
neighborhoods. 2 The housing project was to consist of 84 units,3 
placed in buildings not exceeding three stories or eight apartments, 
constructed on 15 separate sites.4 CHA, which was in charge of 
building the project, and HUD,5 which was to fund much of it, were 
both under court order to build low-rent, scattered-site housing in 
predominatly white neighborhoods in order to remedy civil rights 
violations they had committed in selecting tenants and sites for 
such projects in the past.s The project at issue in NO-CHA was the 
first to be built in compliance with the order. 
In preparing for construction, HUD and CHA, following a proce-
dure whose details are outlined below, considered the project's ex-
pected environmental effects and concluded that these effects did 
not bring the project within the ambit of the Section 102(2)(C) EIS 
requirement.7 NO-CHA sought to enjoin construction until an EIS 
was prepared. NO-CHA did not dispute the procedures HUD and 
CHA followed or the conclusions they reached regarding those 
items-primarily sewage facilities, traffic patterns, and similar fea-
tures of neighborhood infrastructure-actually included in their 
environmental study; but claimed that the agencies had neglected 
to consider one element of the environment so important that it 
required an EIS devoted to it alone. This element was the quality 
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of the tenants who would live in the project. More exactly, according 
to the NO-eHA complaint, "as a statistical whole", and "as com-
pared to the social class characteristics of the plaintiffs", "low in-
come families of the kind that reside" in CRA housing possess: 
(a) ... a higher propensity toward criminal behavior and acts of physi-
cal violence than do the social classes of the plaintiffs. 
(b) . . . a disregard for the physical maintenance of real and personal 
property which is in direct contrast to the high degree of care with which 
the plaintiffs' social classes treat their property. 
(c) ... a lower commitment to hard work for future oriented goals with 
little or no immediate reward than. . . the social classes of the plain-
tiffs [haveV 
The District Court denied the injunction, with costs to the defen-
dants; an appeal is now pending before the Seventh Circuit.9 
The NO-eHA case is remarkable in that social class characteris-
tics are the sole alleged "environmental impact" at issue. Since NO-
eHA avoids complex questions of traffic and population density, 
sewage disposal, architectural nonconformity and the like, it is a 
useful heuristic device for exploring the limits of NEPA's applicabil-
ity to issues based on social class considerations. As the trial court 
in NO-eHA indicates,10 it is unthinkable that NEPA was intended 
to be used as a vehicle for preserving social class homogeneity; 11 
nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to isolate the reasons why 
NEPA's admittedly broad concept of "environment", which clearly 
encompasses many aspects of urban life,12 does not and should not 
include the NO-eHA plaintiffs' concerns. Using NO-eHA as a point 
of departure, this article will explore various means of limiting Sec-
tion l02(2)(C) as applied to social rather than physical impacts, 
particularly the behavioral class characteristics of human beings. 
These means of limitation fall into three general categories: 
(1) statutory interpretation, in the light of NEPA's history, language, 
general policy and regulatory scheme; 
(2) evidentiary and jurisprudential considerations; that is, the pro-
priety, and the difficulty, of administrative and judicial decisionmaking 
based on statistical, sociological, or predictive data; and 
(3) consitutional considerations. 
However, before discussing means of limiting NEPA's EIS re-
quirement, one must explain why such a limitation is of practical 
significance. On its face, NEPA is not a demanding law. Its relevant 
provisions have two general objectives: to assure the production and 
distribution by agencies of reports on the expected environmental 
EXCLUDING THE POOR 83 
effects of projects they propose; and to force agencies to consider 
such effects in their decisionmaking processes. 13 The EIS is the de-
vice by which these objects are to be attained. But if NEPA is, as 
it appears, limited to extracting information and to requiring that 
this information be included in agency deliberations, why should 
HUD and CHA balk at preparing an EIS, and why should EIS 
preparation ever be discouraged? 
The first answer is that NEPA may not be what it appears. The 
Eighth Circuit has held that NEPA restricts the scope of agency 
action as well as dictating consideration of various factors.14 How-
ever, some courts reject this "substantive" interpretation of Section 
102(2)(C) entirely;15 and others apparently confine "substantive" 
review to instances where the defendant agency has acted "arbitrar-
ily and capriciously" in pursuing a project which its own EIS has 
declared needlessly harmful to the environment. 18 Barring a major 
reversal in the Supreme Court, the idea seems to be established that 
NEPA gives courts the power to reconsider substantive agency deci-
sions as well as agency procedures, although the details and limits 
of this power will be difficult to defineY 
Second, as a practical matter procedural obligations have numer-
ous substantive effects. The placing of facts before an agency creates 
bureaucratic, political, and public pressures to take these facts into 
account during the decisionmaking process. The delays caused by 
the EIS process are an obvious example of "procedure" affecting 
"substance". At least 90 days must pass between the publication of 
a draft EIS and the agency's decision to proceed with the project 
studied; another 30 days are required to entertain public and agency 
comment after the production of the final EIS.18 To these four 
months must be added the time (often considerable) necessary to 
prepare a complete EIS. Additional delay may be incurred if public 
hearings are held-a practice encouraged by the influential guide-
lines of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), at least 
where extensive and controversial projects are involved. 
A third reason why an agency like CHA might resist implement-
ing NEPA's EIS requirements is that, even when it does not result 
in abandonment or substantial modification of the proposed project, 
EIS preparation is itself enormously costly. In many instances, the 
cost of the necessary studies may run into the tens of thousands of 
dollars.20 There is reason to fear that this expense may in many 
instances be borne by local housing project developers,21 thereby 
decreasing the number of units eventually constructed. If citizen 
suits to block public housing on the basis of a "social impact" inter-
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pretation of NEPA become common, the fiscal and manpower drain 
on local developers forced to defend such suits could be enormous. 
This last possibility raises a fourth potential effect of requiring 
the consideration of social impacts of the NO-CHA variety in im-
pact statements: the drain on judicial resources. The trial in NO-
CHA took six weeks, and its transcripts indicate that most of that 
time was spent vainly attempting to define terms and and to recon-
cile opposing experts whose views on the "class characteristics" of 
Chicago's poor radically diverged. At the end of the trial, Judge 
Hoffman noted that "the conclusions of the expert witnesses are 
difficult, if not impossible, to verify and substantiate."22 
Fifth, and most generally: in deciding whether social class data 
should be included in impact statements, it should be stressed that 
NEPA is not only a decision-making aid in particular projects, but 
also the major statutory means of setting and debating general envi-
ronmental policy and publicizing information considered environ-
mentally relevant.23 Individual statements are sent to "appropriate 
Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop 
and enforce environmental standards";24 and these statements be-
come part of the information pool used by policymakers and inter-
ested members of the public.25 
NEPA's policymaking role is one of the few clear concepts to 
emerge from the statute's legislative history. For example, the Sen-
ate Report on NEPA stresses the need for 
the Nation's endorsement of a set of resource management values which 
. . . merit the support of all social institutions . . . . Federal action 
must rest on a clear statement of the values and goals we seek: in short, 
a national environmental policy. . . . It is necessary to move ahead to 
define the "environmental" desires of the American people in opera-
tional terms that the President, Governmental agencies at all levels, the 
courts, private enterprise, and the public can consider and rely upon.28 
Whatever the merits of including data as to social classes or other 
"social impact" data in NEPA studies of individual projects, the 
question remains whether such data should become part of our 
"operational" definition of "environment". Surely social class hom-
ogeneity should not be incorporated, even indirectly,27 in the policy 
goals of NEPA. It is also doubtful whether statistical studies pur-
porting, as the NO-CHA studies did, to predict human behavior 
should become routine bases for interagency comment and decision-
making, public scrutiny, or state statutes modeled on NEPA. Aside 
from the serious risks of inaccuracy and unfairness arising from such 
studies, the inclusion of class-based generalizations (especially 
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when negative and ascribed to the underprivileged) in the NEPA 
policymaking process may create the risk of further setting rich 
against poor, minorities against whites, and "middle class" environ-
mentalists against the inadequately housed. 
n. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY LIMITS ON NEPA's ApPLICABILTY TO 
SOCIAL IMPACTS28 
One needs a skeletal grasp of NEPA's administrative scheme in 
order to debate whether social class characteristics, or other social 
impacts, should be included in the system. Title II ofNEPA creates· 
the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) with duties, vaguely 
and broadly defined in the statute, concerning the collection and 
analysis of environmental data; the production of reports; and the 
supervision of agency procedures for drafting impact statements.29 
In March of 1970, CEQ was empowered by executive order to issue 
guidelines governing agency procedures for compliance with Section 
102(2)(C).30 HUD's regulations follow the system suggested by the 
guidelines, with a few embellishments. HUD uses three categories 
to sort projects according to their environmental effects. The first, 
called a Normal Environmental Clearance, is "a consistency check 
with HUD environmental policies and standards and a brief evalua-
tion of environmental impact."31 Its purpose is apparently to deter-
mine whether the project passes the threshold of environmental 
"significance" mentioned in NEPA and the guidelines.32 The sec-
ond, or Special Clearance, is for projects which appear to pass the 
threshold, and consists essentially of a preliminary and internal 
version of the EIS.33 Finally, for projects which have already been 
judged significant (through either a Special or Normal Clearance 
investigation, or because there has never been any question), there 
is the EIS, which is produced in draft and final form. 34 
The basic concepts from which this complex system is derived are 
extremely broad. What, for example, constitutes a "major Federal 
action", what a "significant effect", and what "the human environ-
ment"? There now exists a large and intricate body of authority 
defining the first two of these terms, and indicating which institu-
tions among those that may plausibly claim the right to define them 
actually have this right and responsibility in particular instances.35 
For example, "significance" is defined by HUD in terms of the 
number of housing units, project costs, or site dimensions;36 by 
CEQ's guidelines as a vague potentiality;37 and by the courts in 
various ways, depending upon how particular courts balance facts 
and values in particular cases.38 Courts have also begun to develop 
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standards of review of agency determinations made at different 
stages of the Section l02(2)(C) process. 3D 
These disputes about the meaning of various phrases, and who 
should have the last word in defining and applying them, are all 
relevant to the situation NO-CHA presents. For example, in the 
case of controversial projects, should the mere public dispute and 
excitement over a project be sufficient to classify the project as 
"significant"? The CEQ guidelines so intimate.4o Or is HUn correct 
that the controversy must "raise substantial environmental issues" 
in order to trigger the Section l02(2)(C) process?41 The trial decision 
in NO-CHA implicitly supports HUn's interpretation. 
In order to answer the questions whether class heterogeneity and 
its possible effects are "significant" and-probably more basic to 
the issue of "people pollution" -whether these effects were intended 
to, or should be, viewed as "environmental" within the meaning of 
Section l02(2)(C), we shall consult the language ofNEPA and judi-
cial interpretations of its terms; NEPA's sparse legislative history; 
CEQ and HUn interpretations; and the relationship of NEPA to 
other Federal statutes and policies. 
A. Linguistic Analysis and Judicial Construction 
None of the broad terms which trigger Section 102(2)(C) are de-
fined in NEPA itself; however, common sense linguistic analysis, 
and a few cases, have some bearing on the applicability of Section 
l02(2)(C)'s terms to situations of the NO-CHA variety. 
First, it is arguable that class homogeneity and its possible effects 
do not "significantly affect" the environment because the alleged 
harm involved is too attenuated. For example, in First National 
Bank of Homestead v. Watson,42 it was held that the granting of a 
bank charter would not "significantly" affect the environment be-
cause the harm plaintiffs alleged-increased local financing, which 
would cause increased urbanization, thereby degrading the urban 
environment in various ways-was too remote, and based on "mere 
speculation." The chain of causation in NO-CHA and, no doubt, in 
many other class-based predictive arguments, is equally atten-
uated: from class membership, to possession ofthe average propens-
ities of that class, to commission of the allegedly harmful actions. 
It may be equally sensible, and far simpler, to admit that both 
Homestead and NO-CHA were concerned with "significant" harm, 
but that the plaintiffs simply did not prove that this harm was at 
all likely to occur. (As will be shown below, the NO-CHA trial court 
apparently adheres to this evidentiary approach.) However, the 
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Homestead decision points up a potentially useful distinction, simi-
lar to the notion of proximate versus factual causation in tort cases: 
an event may be almost certain to produce various effects, yet these 
effects may be extremely distant in time, and dependent on numer-
ous subsequent (though also near-certain) events-as, for example, 
in the case of preliminary agency budgeting, or agency approval of 
a foolproof birth-control device. This temporal or causal remoteness 
affords a basis, distinct from evidentiary bases, for limiting Section 
l02(2)(C) in order to avoid its being held applicable to virtually all 
Federal activities. 
Another possibility for limiting Section l02(2)(C)'s applicability 
to social class-based allegations is, of course, to demonstrate that 
the harm alleged, even if "significant", does not constitute an effect 
on the "environment". Accordingly, the trial court in NO-CHA 
noted "at the outset" that people can be polluters, but not pollu-
tion, and that "[e]nvironmental impact in the meaning of the Act 
cannot be reasonably construed to include a class of persons per 
se" .43 
However, this "simple point of English usage"44 has not been 
clearly and unqualifiedly recognized in those few cases whose facts 
or analytic modes resemble NO-CHA's. There are five such cases: 
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn;45 Goose Hollow Foothills 
League v. Romney;48 Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 
Commission v. U.S. Postal Service;47 and the Hanly cases (Hanly 
v. Mitchell-Hanly 1_48 and Hanly v. Kleindienst-Hanly 1[49). 
Of the five cases, Hiram Clarke superficially most resembles NO-
CHA, largely on the basis of one phrase. The plaintiffs in Hiram 
Clarke alleged that HUD had failed to comply with its own regula-
tions or NEPA in writing a negative threshold statement for a 272 
unit low and moderate income housing project. 50 The court found 
simply that HUD had considered all pertinent environmental ef-
fects, and that none of its findings was unreasonable. 51 Among these 
effects was something called "deteriorating neighborhood influ-
ences";52 however, there is absolutely no indication of what HUD 
meant by this phrase, or whether failure to consider these "influ-
ences" would have affected the court's decision. 
Goose Hollow concerned another HUD-financed project, this one 
a high-rise student apartment building which was to be constructed 
in an otherwise low-rise area.53 HUD had endorsed without com-
ment the builder's summary conclusion that the project would have 
no significant environmental impact. The court found HUD's exam-
ination inadequate because, inter alia, "the building will undoubt-
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edly change the character of the neighborhood. "54 This is obviously 
so, but the kinds of changes the court had in mind were the project's 
structural nonconformity and its effects on population density, both 
of which were cited by the court.55 The meaning of "neighborhood 
character" thus significantly differs from that assigned it by the 
NO-CHA plaintiffs. 
The Maryland case involved the proposed construction of a large 
mail-sorting center just off an interstate highway. The case is rele-
vant to the issues in NO-CHA in two respects. First, the court 
elaborated upon the idea, first presented as a major proposition in 
Hanly II, infra, that judicial vigilance in scrutinizing projects should 
depend on whether they depart from the prevailing modes of land 
use in their proposed areas. The Maryland formulation runs thus: 
when agency projects conform to local zoning specifications, the 
court's superintendence of agency environmental review should be 
less stringent than in cases where the agency had used its superior 
power to overcome customary local requirements. The Maryland 
court states that zoning regulations embody important aesthetic, 
cultural and social preferences of the locality and that, so long as 
local zoning patterns are followed, reviewing courts need consider 
only such "hard" environmental factors as air and water pollution, 
building size, and other physical aspects in determining the ade-
quacy of agency environmental studies.58 Two implications of the 
Maryland formulation are important to the NO-CHA case. First, 
under the Maryland approach, NO-CHA should have been dis-
missed at the outset, since there was no dispute as to the project's 
"hard" environmental features and the project conformed to local 
zoning specifications. Second, Maryland implies that cultural, aes-
thetic, and social issues should be subsumed in the law of land use 
planning, and subject to the constitutional and statutory restric-
tions which restrict this branch of local government. 
More directly important, however, the Maryland court rejects the 
claim that class membership could ever be considered "environ-
mental" within the meaning of NEPA. One of the reasons for con-
testing the building, the court writes, 
was the prospect of an influx of low-income workers into the County. 
Concerned persons might fashion a claim, supported by linguistics and 
etymology, that there is an impact from people pollution on "environ-
ment", if the term be stretched to its maximum. We think this type of 
effect cannot fairly be projected as having been within the contempla-
tion of Congress. ft7 
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The Hanly cases concerned the construction of a large Federal jail 
facing two apartment buildings in Manhattan. Hanly I held that the 
General Services Administration (GSA) had failed to comply with 
Section l02(2)(C) in that its threshold report did not consider the 
"peculiar environmental impact of squeezing a jail into a narrow 
area directly across from two apartment houses".58 The court di-
rected GSA to consider as part of its environmental review the possi-
bilities that the future prisoners might riot or create high noise 
levels, or that the drug treatment center to be attached to the jail 
might increase drug traffic or crime in the neighborhood. 59 
In its second report, GSA again found no significant environmen-
tal effect and hence no need to prepare an EIS.80 This second report 
came before the court in Hanly II. The Hanly II court found the new 
report adequate in its treatment of the potential environmental 
threats of riot and noise. However, the court held that GSA's failure 
to consider the question whether crime might increase in the neigh-
borhood constituted grounds for remand to GSA for findings on that 
subject.81 
The Hanly courts apparently accept the principle that a group's 
future behavior may be accurately enough predicted, and is other-
wise sufficiently relevant, to make its members' presence in a com-
munitya matter of environmental concern cognizable by adminis-
trative bodies and courts. The cases do not present an insurmounta-
ble problem ifthe inmates of the jail are alone considered: prisoners, 
unlike the low-income families in NO-CHA, have all been adjudged 
guilty of crimes, and a certain circumscription of their rights is 
recognized by present law as proper on that account. One such 
circumscription might conceivably be a power in administrative or 
judicial organs to make predictions of the inmates' future behavior 
based on their status as prisoners. However, though the language of 
the case is confusing on this point, it appears that the court's chief 
concern was not the prisoners' behavior, but that of the outpatients 
who would use the drug treatment center which the court believed 
was to be attached to the jail.82 Hanly II thus seems to apply the 
principle the NO-CHA plaintiffs sought to establish: that people, 
many of whom will not have been convicted of any offense in a court 
of law, can constitute an "environmental" threat under NEPA sim-
ply because of what their presence (here merely transient) in the 
neighborhood might entail. 
There are three means of limiting the scope of the Hanly cases. 
The first is technical: it appears that the project developers had 
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rejected their plans for a clinic before the Hanly cases were de-
cided,63 and that the court's remarks concerning outpatient behavior 
were therefore merely dicta directed to an issue already moot. A 
second point is that statutes vary; the rationale for using predictive 
methods when dealing with people who are physically addicted to 
drugs, may disintegrate in the case of people who are simply poor 
and seeking public housing, neither of which attributes is a crime 
or disease. The third and best response is that the Hanly court did 
not mean to enshrine the NO-CHA plaintiffs' theory, but got con-
fused. In its best known passage, the Hanly II court stated that, 
unlike the real possibility of a rise in neighborhood crime rates due 
to the new jail's presence, the neighbors' "psychological distaste for 
having a jail located so close to residential apartments" is not a 
datum requiring inclusion in an EIS, because "psychological and 
sociological effects ... do not lend themselves to measurement."64 
The court contrasted such effects with factors "such as noise, which 
can be related to decibels ... " and crime, "for which crime statis-
tics are available." But if the decision turns on the accuracy of 
measurement, crime statistics are no better than "psychological 
distaste": their precision comes from the fact that they tell us about 
the past rather than what a group will do in the future in a new 
place.65 
It is difficult to draw any clear limiting principles from the NO-
CHA trial decision and the five cases just discussed. However, as-
suming that the other cases can be distinguished as set forth above, 
it appears from Maryland and the NO-CHA trial decision that the 
Federal courts are likely to reject the claim that changes in class 
composition alone are properly cognizable as "environmental" 
under Section 102(2)(C). 
B. A Note on Research to Determine NEPA's "Legislative Intent" 
One should approach the question of the intent ofNEPA's drafts-
men with more than the customary skepticism. For one thing, 
NEPA's legislative history is sparse. For another, the documents 
that do exist are extremely general and vague; one court character-
ized NEPA as "opaque" and "woefully ambiguous",68 and this eval-
uation applies equally to the reports and hearings on the statute. 
The first step in analyzing NEPA's legislative intent and perhaps 
the most fruitful one in the context of social impact, is to recall the 
events and attitudes prevalent in the nation when Congress was 
considering the bill. NEPA was signed into law three and a half 
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months before the first Earth Day. The debate on the Alaska Pipe-
line was just beginning. One probable reason for the popularity of 
the environmental cause in 1969 is that environmental problems 
seemed to lack the controversy ignited by issues which placed 
classes or subcultures in conflict. Thus, analysis of the popular liter-
ature published while NEPA was being considered may provide the 
best means of understanding two phrases in NEPA which might 
otherwise be understood as directed toward the issue of class compo-
sition. The requirement that "presently unquantified environmen-
tal amenities and values" receive equal attention in agency deliber-
ations with "economic and technical consideration" (Section 
102(2)(B» may simply mean that such externalities as clean air, 
which are not included in the GNP, must be considered. The re-
quirement of Section 102(2)(A) that agencies use a "systematic, 
interdisciplinary approach" should also be viewed in this historical 
light. 
Some of the testimony before committees, however, may arguably 
not be consistent with this interpretation. For example, Dr. DuB-
ridge, the President's Science Advisor, told the Senate Committee 
that: 
[E]verything we live with is of course our environment, whether it is 
this beautiful room, this beautiful building, the streets we walk on, the 
hikes we take in the woods ... everything is environment, and to im-
prove everything in our environment is obviously, therefore, a very diffi-
cult task.67 
However, the comprehensiveness of this definition is belied by Dr. 
DuBridge's theory of environmental effects-which must, he says, 
be thought of as waste products of processes necessary to civilized 
human life-and by the examples he cites, which exclude any hint 
that a class of people may be within NEPA's purview as polluting 
agents. 68 
The rest of the legislative record is similarly ambiguous. The 
closest the reports come to favoring the NO-CHA plaintiffs' position 
is a reference to "conditions within our central cities which result 
in civil unrest and detract from man's social and psychological well-
being".69 These conditions might conceivably include ill-considered, 
unreviewed class-mixing; or the phrase may simply mean that the 
physical and aesthetic environment in the cities is such as to enrage 
its population.70 
C. Administrative Interpretations 
The CEQ Guidelines do not define "environment". However, they 
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do provide that, in drafting impact statements, agencies should 
consider, inter alia, "Land Use Changes, Planning and Regulation 
of Land Development"; "Redevelopment and Construction in 
Built-up Areas"; "Density and Congestion Mitigation"; and-
particularly relevant to this article's subject matter-"Neighbor-
hood Character and Continuity" and "Impacts on Low-Income 
Populations".71 None of these categories is explained. However, 
this next-to-Iast rubric may include what NO-CHA had in mind; 
and while there is nothing else in the guidelines themselves to 
suggest that CEQ intended to trespass into the area of exclu-
sionary zoning, CEQ's 1973 Annual Report indicates an interest 
in class composition. In its section on the urban environment, the 
report states that diversity of race, age, and wealth among a 
neighborhood's residents improves the local environment.72 This 
statement clearly accepts the terms of NO-CHA's argument-that 
certain categorical characteristics of a group of people may properly 
be thought of as part of their neighbors' environment-but CEQ's 
conclusions differ from NO-CHA's allegations by 180 degrees. 
HUD's Regulations define "environment" only by means of ex-
amples, none of which appears relevant to the issue of social class 
interaction.73 However, HUD's "ECO-1 Form" (the document used 
in the agency's initial collection of raw data for purposes of project-
ing environmental effects) is more telling: among the desired data 
are figures on neighborhood racial and economic composition and 
the project's potential for furnishing "social interaction and pri-
vacy".74 However, it appears that neither the Normal nor Special 
Clearance procedures contemplates the use of this raw data;75 and 
nothing in the body of the regulations indicates that HUD has con-
sciously included these factors as part of its view of the environment 
for NEPA purposes. The ECO-1 listing may thus simply be an 
information-gathering device, and not a representation that the 
data so gathered are relevant to the purpose of the document in 
which they appear76-although this apparent waste of effort and 
data seems peculiar. 
D. NEPA's Interaction with Other Statutes and Policies 
NEPA requires that its directives be followed "to the fullest ex-
tent possible".77 The Conference Report on NEPA interprets this 
phrase to mean that an agency must comply "unless the existing 
law applicable to such agency's operations expressly prohibits or 
makes full compliance with one of the directives impossible".78 
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CEQ's interpretation of this clause is identical,79 and judicial deci-
sions have reinforced this rather stringent interpretation.80 
Any lawsuit alleging class heterogeneity as an adverse environ-
mental effect under NEPA may have the effect of bringing that 
statute into conflict with various other statutes to which HUD is 
subject (including the HUD Acts of 1965 and 1968;81 the United 
States Housing Act of 1937;82 the Housing Act of 1949;83 and the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 196884), although arguably the declara-
tions of policy they contain may be insufficiently prescriptive to 
bring them into conflict with NEPA's requirements. 
The duties the housing statutes impose on HUD include provid-
ing low-income families with "decent, safe, and sanitary dwell-
ings";85 and ridding the nation of "unsafe and unsanitary housing 
conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe and sanitary dwell-
ings. "86 On first thought, both NEPA and the housing laws seem to 
be malleable enough to avoid clear conflict. However, if one follows 
the implications of such an accomodation to its logical conclusion 
when applied to a case such as NO-CHA, the reconciliation no 
longer seems possible. For (assuming that NEPA has even the 
slightest substantive effect) if it is required that HUD consider class 
attributes as "environmental", it must then be permissible to kill 
or relocate projects on the sole basis of predicted adverse conse-
quences from mixing classes. To delay, deny, or restrict housing 
solely on the basis of class attributes-or, at least, lower class attrib-
utes-seems to conflict with the basic goals of the housing laws.87 
When the racial overtones of housing location are considered (and 
they are rarely absent in public housing cases-for example, some 
90% ofCHA's tenants were black when NO-CHA was brought)88, the 
possibility of conflict with the Civil Rights Acts arises. The 1964 Act 
forbids discrimination in any federally-financed program; the 1968 
Act requires that HUD take affirmative action to provide fair hous-
ing.89 When, as in NO-CHA, there is a history of past racial segrega-
tion, the Civil Rights Acts would clearly override any NEPA-based 
mandate to segregate classes and, hence, races. Indeed, any decision 
to segregate classes whose effects would include de facto segregation 
of races can hardly constitute the "affirmative action" envisioned 
by the 1968 Act. This possibility of conflict with constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of equal protection argues strongly, therefore, for 
an interpretion ofNEPA which would avoid the conflict by elimi-
nating from NEPA's purview the factor of class or racial homogene-
ity. 
In addition, at least two sections of NEPA are inconsistent with 
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the NO-CHA plaintiffs' underlying premise that Section 102(2) 
(C) is applicable to social class issues. Section 101(a), the Declara-
tion of National Environmental Policy, succinctly states the Con-
gressional goal of "restoring and maintaining environmental qual-
ity" while "fulfilling the social, economic and other requirements of 
present and future generations of Americans" (emphasis added). 
The more specific environmental goals enumerated in § 101(b) are 
to be accomplished not absolutely and at any cost, but only by "all 
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of 
national policy" (emphasis added). This qualifying language indi-
cates that balancing environmental factors with the nation's various 
social, economic and political goals is to take place before federal 
action occurs. The section makes clear that NEPA does not prohibit 
environmental degradation where compelling national policies exist 
which may entail some such damage. Where other policies of such 
importance exist, the provisions of § 102(2)(C) must yield. 
In view of the forceful Congressional expressions in the housing 
enactments cited supra, providing decent dwellings for the people 
who do not now have them (the poor) must be categorized as an 
essential element of national policy. NEPA, accordingly, accomo-
dates this national policy so long as a reasonable trade-off of envi-
ronmental and non-environmental goals takes place. 
This interpretation is further buttressed by § 105, which -states 
that "The policies and goals set forth in this Act are supplementary 
to those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies" 
(emphasis added). In HUD's case, such authorizations include those 
of the Housing and Civil Rights Acts which endorse affirmative 
action toward integrated housing. To adopt the NO-CHA plaintiffs' 
interpretation would tend to place NEPA in conflict with these 
other statutes, in spite of NEPA's own language that it is to be 
supplementary to them. 
III. EVIDENTIARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL LIMITATIONS 
The District Court's grounds for dismissal in NO-eRA are some-
what obscure. The court noted that "NEPA cannot reasonably be 
construed to include a class of persons per se", 90 from which one 
would infer a holding that, as a matter of statutory construction, 
class characteristics are never properly cognizable under NEPA. 
However, the decision appears to rest ultimately not so much on 
statutory interpretation as on evidentiary failure, for the court goes 
on to say: 
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The provisions of the Act concern actions which harm or affect the 
environment. Therefore, the social and economic characteristics of the 
potential occupants of public housing as such are not determinative. . . 
the relevant consideration is whether acts or actions resulting from the 
social and economic characteristics will affect the environment91 (em-
phasis added). 
The court found that NO-CHA had not proved that such actions 
would in fact result. 92 
The court's decision indicates a high degree of skepticism as to 
whether NO-CHA's predictions admit of judicial proof: 
Prognosticating human behavior and analyzing its consequences on the 
human environment is an especially difficult, if not impossible task. . . 
Sociology, a discipline attempting such prediction, has not yet attained 
the stage of an exact science. By its very nature, it relies upon general 
conclusions drawn from average propositions based on sample data. The 
different expert conclusions that may be drawn from the same data is 
[sic] evident not only in the evidence before this court, but in the 
literature of the social sciences. As such, these conclusions are not very 
persuasive in a court of law. 93 
This section will explore, first and fairly briefly, various specific 
evidentiary insufficiencies which occurred in NO-CHA, or might be 
expected to occur in similar cases; and, second, the general ques-
tions whether sociological, or other statistical, predictive evidence 
of class behavior is jurisprudentially appropriate or sufficiently reli-
able for use in adjudicative proceedings. 
A. Specific Evidentiary Problems in a "Social Class Impact" Suit 
The necessary evidentiary elements of NO-CHA's claim, or any 
cause of action based on the alleged harmfulness of class hetero-
geneity, are more numerous than one would at first suppose. At the 
outset, the plaintiffs must define the classes involved. This can be 
an exceedingly complex task, as NO-CHA attests. For example, the 
NO-CHA complaint speaks of "low-income families of the kind that 
reside in housing provided by the CHA";94 it was never entirely clear 
whether membership in the disfavored class-the class allegedly 
more statistically likely to harm the environment-was determined 
primarily by income, by other class indicia such as possession of 
"lower class values", 95 or by generalizations from some sample pop-
ulation (past CHA tenants, the Chicago poor, public housing appli-
cants generally, etc.).96 
As NO-CHA's reference to "low-income families of the kind" that 
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reside in CHA housing suggests, the definition of the classes in-
volved may be vulnerable to attack as embodying hidden premises. 
That CHA tenants are a certain "kind" of poor people-or that all 
poor people, or significantly more poor than nonpoor people, are of 
this "kind"-is obviously the major evidentiary issue in litigation. 
It may be possible to defeat allegations such as NO-CHA's simply 
by outlining the chain of inferences plaintiffs rely upon and pointing 
out inconsistencies or hidden, unsubstantiated assumptions in each 
link. One of the Chicago Housing Authority's major arguments at 
both trial97 and appeal98 involved outlining a series of inferences it 
considered spurious, or unproven, in the chain purportedly linking 
the statistical income, family, etc., characteristics of the 1970 CHA 
tenant population with the antisocial characteristics cited in the 
NO-CHA complaint. 
One of the most important inferential weaknesses alleged by the 
NO-CHA defendants was the plaintiffs' experts' frequent assump-
tion that subgroups chosen from some larger group would possess 
the "average" characteristics of that group.99 Several points are 
worth noting on the potential probative weaknesses of such averag-
ing. First, its accuracy will probably decrease proportionally with 
the size of the subgroup. Second, in cases such as NO-CHA, which 
rest on comparisons between two groups of people, one should avoid 
confusing a significantly higher relative incidence of some charac-
teristic with an absolutely high incidence. (That is, if the average 
incidence of some characteristic is twice as high in group A as in 
group B, the respective percentages may be so low-e.g., .2% and 
.1 %-as to produce scant likelihood that any member of some 
subgroup, particularly a small subgroup, of B will possess the char-
acteristic.) Third, in many cases it may be easy to screen out those 
characteristics which constitute, or allegedly lead to, the "environ-
mental" harm at issue}OO Predictions that 90% of a group will pos-
sess a characteristic are irrelevant if only those members who do not 
possess it will be chosen as tenants. 
Once they have defined the disfavored class, proved its harmful 
characteristics, and somehow shown that these characteristics will 
be possessed by the tenants who will occupy the housing at issue, 
those opposing class heterogeneity have proved only half their case. 
They must repeat this process for the class they are trying to "pro-
tect". If, as in NO-CHA, alleged harm derives from the introduction 
of a new element which will change neighborhood character, the 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the neighborhood's present inhab-
itants possess characteristics relevantly different from those of the 
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disfavored class. IOI According to the trial court, NO-CHA failed in 
this regard. Although evidence concerning middle- and working-
class character in general was introduced, there was little showing 
that the evidence accurately described these plaintiffs' neighbor-
hood, and no showing at all that it described these individual plain-
tiffs. 102 
B. General Evidentiary and Jurisprudential Considerations 
As the NO-CHA trial decision implies,103 the unreliability of pre-
dictive, statistical sociological evidence makes it unsuitable for use 
in adjudicatory proceedings, especially in cases involvin~ overall 
social class comparison. From the standpoint of technical eviden-
tiary considerations, such evidence is likely to be unreliable, confus-
ing, difficult to verify and so time-consuming as to outweigh what-
ever probative value it might have. For these reasons, any decision-
maker, judicial or otherwise, would often do well to avoid this quag-
mire. Moreover, even ignoring questions of reliability and compre-
hensibility to nonexperts, predictive evidence based on social class 
characteristics is unsuited to the judicial forum on the jurispruden-
tial ground that it runs counter to the voluntaristic view of human 
beings, and the ideal of individualized, rule-bound adjudication 
which characterize our tribunals. 
During the course of the NO-CHA trial, Judge Hoffman stated: 
I have had one sociologist .. say from the witness stand, not in this case, 
that you can probably find a distinguished sociologist to take the oppos-
ite position in nearly every case. I04 
While differences in expert opinion occur in all sciences, especially 
when experts are recruited by advocates, sociology appears particu-
larly dispute-ridden, at least in its present youthful stage.105 And 
since large groups of complex human beings constitute the object of 
sociological study, such disputes are likely to continue: 106 the sociol-
ogist's data will always be incomplete and uncontrolled. 
Despite these weaknesses, the sociologist's statistical data and 
expert conclusions often have the ring of authority. This authorita-
tiveness may be dangerously misleading in some instances,107 espe-
cially since the assumptions sociologists make are extremely diffi-
cult for non experts to isolate and verify. While experts are generally 
permitted to testify on the basis of assumptions, the law is clear that 
an expert opinion is "no better than the assumptions on which it is 
based. "108 
As yet, there have been few cases or articles dealing with the use 
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of social scientists as expert witnesses. lo9 Evidence from social psy-
chologists has been admitted in desegregation cases in order to dem-
onstrate the psychological harm caused by segregation;llo but the 
extent to which the courts have relied on such evidence is unclear. 
Evidence based on what might loosely be defined as "sociological" 
statistics has gained widespread acceptance in only one area, 
namely opinion surveys, where they are generally used to test con-
sumer brand name identification in trademark or unfair competi-
tion cases. III However, opinion survey evidence is carefully screened 
for correctness in universe and sample selection. ll2 
The two areas mentioned above are distinguishable from the pre-
dictive use of sociological class generalizations. Opinion survey evi-
dence is the only practicable means of determining whether, and to 
what extent, the subject consumer class presently recognizes a par-
ticular trademark; the alternative would be polling the entire class. 
Similarly, the social psychology evidence used in the desegregation 
cases was of obvious relevance, whatever its reliability, to the issue 
of how students generally feel (assuming these feelings are material 
in segregation cases). Such evidence may in fact be the only means 
of demonstrating the nature and extent of such feelings. 
By contrast, the evidence offered in NO-CHA attempted to 
predict the future behavior-not describe the feelings or 
attitudes-of small groups on the basis of generalizations from the 
past behavior and attitudes of a far larger group. 
Policy considerations-and such considerations often determine 
the admissibility of evidence, as in the case of Fourth Amendment 
exclusions-afford another possible basis for distinguishing the de-
segregation cases from NO-CHA and cases like it; the school deseg-
regation evidence was offered as an aid to understanding the effect 
of constitutionally doubtful practices, with the ultimate goal of en-
larging the rights of an underprivileged group; while the plaintiffs' 
sociological evidence in NO-CHA was relied upon as the sole basis 
for restricting the rights of an underprivileged group. 
Since sociological predictions of the NO-CHA variety effectively 
place the character of an entire class in issue, an analysis of the 
admissibility of character evidence may bear on the merits of admit-
ting such evidence. All courts disallow use of character evidence, 
whether direct or by means of reputation, to establish the probabil-
ity of guilt in criminal proceedings. ll3 Evidence as to character or 
propensity is also often excluded when offered as evidence of civil 
negligence. ll4 When the fact to be proved is not, as is customary, the 
past conduct of an individual in a specific instance, but the future 
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occurence of antisocial practices on the part of members of a large 
group, the policy and reliability rationales for excluding "character" 
evidence become particularly compelling. 
The case for social class homogeneity is based on statistical char-
acter evidence; it is therefore doubly suspect in practice. Statistical 
evidence is often viewed skeptically, when not completely excluded, 
by the courts. Although judicial factfinding is perforce based on 
probability-e.g., in civil cases, on a defendant's culpability being 
"more likely than not"-"the law refuses to honor its own formula 
when the evidence is coldly 'statistical' ."115 
The scholarly treatment of,116 and leading cases on,117 the use of 
statistics as evidence have all dealt with the identity or culpability 
of single defendants118 on the basis of their possessing certain statist-
ically relevant characteristics;119 NO-CHA is novel in its attempted 
predictive use of statistics, and in its application of statistics to 
groups rather than individuals. 
The fact that statistical inferences of the kind offered by NO-
CHA concern groups might be cited as support for admitting, and 
heavily weighing, the statistical evidence involved. Assuming them 
to be free from mathematical and sampling errors, and the other 
pitfalls discussed above, statistical generalizations concerning 
groups are likely to be true of some members of the group. That is, 
there is less danger of arriving at an individualized conclusion (e.g., 
Jones assaulted Smith) which is completely incorrect. However, 
when the subgroup to whom the generalization purportedly applies 
is small, either absolutely or in relation to the size of the group 
concerning which the generalization is made, the situation ob-
viously approaches that of a single defendant. Moreover, statistical 
generalizations concerning a group, even if overwhelmingly likely to 
apply to some of its members, are also likely not to apply to some 
other members. The rights and interests of those members should 
be borne in mind even in instances, if they exist, of demonstrably 
valid group statistics. (At the very least, these rights and interests 
should be weighed in any environmental policy decision.) 
It might be objected that attacking the use of statistical analysis 
is an anachronistic approach to the problems NO-CHA presents: 
that courts, and the public, have mistrusted statistics for two rea-
sons-fear of errors and confusion, and simple distrust of what, to 
courts and the general public, at least, is an innovation. Distrust of 
new methods simply because they are new is irrational (the argu-
ment continues) and fears of error and confusion must be dealt with 
on a case-by-case basis, with statistics the likely victor in a growing 
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number of cases due to the increasing sophistication and reliability 
of statistical analysis. Accordingly, (the argument concludes) those 
commentators who analyze, and thereby purportedly help create, 
legal "trends" should view statistical analysis as the wave of the 
future, pointing to the example of recent cases under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act.120 
In several Title VII cases, courts have accepted statistical evi-
dence as a means of proving discriminatory hiring, firing, and other 
employment practices: 121 
In most such decisions, courts have identified, and declared unlawful, 
patterns of systemic racial discrimination; that is, discrimination 
wherein apparently neutral criteria have the effect of perpetuating past 
racial discrimination .122 
While one should use whatever means are necessary-and, perhaps, 
whatever means are even arguably helpful-to remedy past discrim-
ination, the Title VII cases are a far cry from exclusionary suits 
under NEPA. As has been noted with reference to school desegrega-
tion, the policies behind the two uses of statistics are contradic-
tory.123 Moreover, the statutory authority for using NEPA as an 
exclusionary zoning device is hardly clear, and hence the court is 
under no requirement to fashion extraordinary judicial enforcement 
mechanisms. Perhaps most important, the kind of statistical gener-
alizations employed by the NO-CHA experts are of dubious proba-
tive value, especially where tenant screening processes, if employed, 
provide a pragmatic alternative to such generalizations. 
As the Housing Authority's trial brief points out, proponents of 
lower-class exclusion who base their arguments on statistically pro-
jected effects, should not be allowed simultaneously to ignore or 
discount the effect of such exclusion on racial or other constitution-
ally projected minorities-which, after all, is the only statistical 
information (apart from surveys, supra) that courts have generally 
allowed. Racial composition is also the most easily verified predic-
tion, since race is a constant and easily identified human character-
istic, and one which cannot overtly be screened out in the tenant-
selection process. 
Apart from their evidentiary problems, statistics purporting to 
predict the behavior of groups present a serious jurisprudential con-
cern. The NO-CHA decision was apparently based at least in part 
on the nature of the legal process; the court noted that: 
The prospective tenants of public housing are individuals and their 
behavior may not be presumed to be identical, or even similar, to other 
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individuals in the same social or economic class. The law regards them 
as free, legally responsible individuals, not as sociological factors in 
deterministic formulae. 124 
Judge Hoffman's statement should not be viewed as an example of 
irrational fear of new evidentiary methods or of the behavioral 
sciences, but as the only response to NO-CHA which is consistent 
with our legal system. While the social sciences seek knowledge 
through discovering societal uniformities, the judiciary seeks its 
ends-which include not only knowledge of the truth, but also ra-
tional application of statutorily enunciated policy, procedural fair-
ness, and the protection of individual rights-through an indivi-
dualistic and non-deterministic view of human beings. As the Hous-
ing Authority maintained, human beings are viewed by the law 
as free agents: whether or not psychological or sociological determinism 
is scientifically true, the law assumes that individuals, unless insane, 
are capable of free and rational choice and [does] not presume [them] 
to be persons who will choose antisocial behavior. 125 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The evidentiary, jurisprudential, and ethical problems raised by 
NO-CHA's claim that NEPA is usable to perpetuate class homo-
geneity are, it is submitted, so egregious as to present serious consti-
tutional issues. While the NO-CHA trial court never reached these 
issues, it is likely that the numerous due process and equal protec-
tion claims raised by the defendants126 were helpful in underscoring 
the unfairness and general ugliness of the NO-CHA allegations. For 
this reason, and because of their independent interest and plausibil-
ity, this section will briefly explore various possibilities for constitu-
tional defenses to claims under Section 102(2)(C) based on social 
class considerations. 
A. Due Process 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although 
rarely applied in cases other than criminal (or quasi-criminal)l27 
procedure, might successfully be invoked in a case as unfair to an 
entire class as NO-CHA. It is well settled that the Due Process 
Clause covers more than deprivations of liberty or property through 
criminal procedures,128 and there are various aspects of the NO- CHA 
theory which might upon detailed analysis be found suspect on due 
process grounds. The fact that there are no cases which apply due 
process standards in similar situations is neither surprising nor dis-
102 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
couraging, since NO-CHA's attempted use of class characteristics 
as a basis for abridging the interest of that class' members has no 
precedent. 
Any determination of adverse environmental impact based solely 
on class characteristics creates an 
irrebuttable presumption that individuals of a certain class are more 
likely to perform harmful actions . . . and would postpone, or perhaps 
deny altogether, such individuals' chance to live in decent housing on 
this sole ground. 129 
In Leary v. US., the Supreme Court held that, in criminal prosecu-
tions, statutory presumptions must fail on due process grounds un-
less the presumed fact is more likely than not to follow from the 
"basic" or actual fact.13o A problematic but reasonable analogy 
might be drawn from Leary to the NO-CHA allegations, and the 
relationship between the "basic" fact in NO-CHA (class member-
ship) and the various types of predicted behavior explored under the 
Leary test. 
Another facet of NO-CHA which, while no more certain than the 
Leary comparison to trigger the Due Process Clause, raises similar 
possibilities for analogy, is the plaintiffs' reliance on propensity and 
behavioral prediction as a means of delaying or risking denial of 
government-sponsored benefits. Mere propensity to commit crimes 
or other harmful acts is very rarely considered a constitutional 
ground for governmental limitation of the rights of citizens. Two 
notable exceptions are parole revocation hearings and mental health 
commitments. However, in the former area some past adjudication 
of individual guilt and a sentence in excess of time already served 
are of course prerequisites for the hearing even to take place. 131 And 
mental health commitments are based on individual determina-
tions, with the rationale for committing or treating unwilling pa-
tients, in the absence of proof of some past anti-social act, being 
questioned at the present time. 132 
Admittedly, delay or even outright denial of housing or other 
government benefits is a far cry from adjudications which may re-
sult in confinement by the state. However, it is clear that some 
opportunity for notice and hearing is required in certain public 
housing cases. For example, in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of 
Durham, the Supreme Court held that tenants in government-
sponsored housing could not be evicted without an explanation of 
eviction grounds and some opportunity to be heard. 133 While the 
NO-CHA situation involves no similar denial of a vested property 
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right, since it deals with proposed housing for unknown tenants, this 
consideration may work both ways: these as-yet-unselected tenants 
may have less to lose, but they are subjected to losing whatever 
chance they may have before anyone has ascertained who they are, 
much less heard their case. 
In sum: although the "property" rights involved in NO-CHA, like 
most other proposed benefits to the poor, are fairly attenuated, the 
process afforded the individuals involved is the most unfair one 
conceivable. The NO-CHA plaintiffs-and NEPA, if interpreted in 
accord with their allegations-are in essence stating that, no matter 
what screening process local housing authorities may employ, and 
no matter what proofs of past and likely behavior prospective ten-
ants might individually produce, any group ofsuch tenants will act 
so as to degrade the environment. 
B. Equal Protection 
The Housing Authority maintained that, if construed to require 
an EIS on the basis of plaintiffs' allegations, Section 102(2)(C) 
would violate the Equal Protection Clause. 134 (Although the Four-
teenth Amendment applies only to state action, standards at least 
as stringent are imposed on Federal statutes and practices on the 
theory that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause binds the 
Federal government whenever the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause would bind a state similarly situated. 135 "Equal 
protection" when used below will encompass this Fifth 
Amendment-guaranteed right.) Neither the NO-CHA court nor any 
other has considered the Equal Protection Clause in NEPA-based 
denials of public housing due to class characteristics; however, the 
Equal Protection Clause has been applied with some success in 
various types of exclusionary zoning cases,136 and seems at least 
equally applicable to cases where NEPA is used by recipients of 
government subsidy to advance class or racial segregation. 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, legislation which abridges a 
"fundamental" interestl37 or involves a "suspect" classification such 
as race l38 must undergo strict scrutiny. This scrutiny includes ensur-
ing that the statute is narrowly drawn to accomplish its goals, that 
less burdensome alternative means are not available, and that the 
legislation or practice furthers a compelling, legitimate governmen-
tal purpose.13D However, absent such a classification or interest, the 
statute or practice must undergo only a minimal scrutiny, which has 
been held to require only that legislation not be purely arbitrary, 
lacking any conceivable "rational" basis as a means of achieving the 
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end sought.140 Until very recently, the rational basis test was invari-
ably used as a judicial rubber stamp, while the strict scrutiny test 
invariably (except in one early case)141 doomed the state activity. 
On at least two occasions in the past few years, the Supreme 
Court has invalidated state action without expressly finding a sus-
pect classification or a fundamental interest, stating in both instan-
ces that the state legislation involved "must rest upon some ground 
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of 
the regulation" .142 However, it appears doubtful that the present 
court will reject its two-tier system and make a rule of this more 
rigorous rational basis test.I4S 
The Housing Authority asserted that NEPA, as construed by NO-
CHA, would violate the Equal Protection Clause "by any test": 
the relief for which plaintiffs pray under NEPA must be strictly scruti-
nized on the ground of racial discrimination. The non-racial classifica-
tions plaintiffs explicitly draw in their complaint also warrant strict, or 
at least heightened, scrutiny. Moreover, plaintiffs' demands do not meet 
even the test of rationality.144 
1. Race. 
Racial classifications, with the probable exception of those de-
signed to remedy the effects of past discrimination,145 are clearly 
"suspect". In the NO-CHA situation, the invocation of race is fairly 
straightforward, as regards NEPA's applicability to the particular 
projects in issue. The proposed project had been judicially ordered 
as a remedy for past de jure segregation,146 the court first demanding 
that the Housing Authority use its "best efforts to increase the 
supply of dwelling units as quickly as possible", 147 and later impos-
ing strict timetables and mandating that a specific number of 
scattered-site units be constructed in predominantly white neigh-
borhoods.148 
The Authority reasoned, cogently enough, that the earlier deci-
sions' specific orders, and their call for "emergency treatment and 
drastic if not bizarre remedies"149 to counteract past discrimination, 
should be read as providing ample ground for triggering strict scru-
tiny and defeating NO-CHA.150 The Authority felt it could rely ei-
ther on the theory that NEPA, if interpreted to require a result 
contravening the earlier (Gautreaux) decisions, would be unconsti-
tutional as applied; or on the similar theory that the Gautreaux 
decisions enunciated a constitutional directive which overrode 
NEPA, much as it would any other conflicting statute. Equally 
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sensible, CHA pointed out that the interests of private individuals 
in protecting their neighborhoods from a few lower-class families 
was hardly a "compelling" governmental interest. 151 
The above theories are clearly correct. However, absent a direc-
tive such as that stemming from the Gautreaux series, the bearing 
of racial equal protection on NEPA's application is more complex. 
In a case identical to NO-CHA, but without any history of constitu-
tional litigation, could the defendants allege past discrimination 
(largely their own!) and argue that EIS preparation which included 
social class mixing as a potential adverse effect, would violate the 
equal protection rights of prospective tenants by delaying or deny-
ing access to the defendants' remedial projects? While this scenario 
is admittedly bizarre, it is difficult to distinguish it analytically 
from the actual NO-CHA situation. 
There remains the question whether, ignoring the past entirely, 
the defendants could successfully challenge a social class-based 
NEPA suit such as NO-CHA on the ground that the prospective 
tenant pool, and/or the allegedly undesirable social class generally, 
contained a statistically high proportion of black people; and that 
therefore any delay in construction due to EIS preparation, as well 
as any decision to halt or alter construction based on considerations 
of class homogeneity, would violate equal protection. This argument 
obviously resembles the discriminatory-impact arguments used in 
exclusionary zoning cases. It is presently unclear whether racially 
discriminatory effect, without a showing of discriminatory motive or 
purpose, is sufficient to trigger equal protection scrutiny in the area 
of exclusionary zoning; a few lower court cases have so held or im-
plied. 152 However, of all possible suits in which racial impact might 
be raised, suits of the NO-CHA variety seem most promising, tacti-
cally if not logically. The explicit classification involved, social 
class, has little to recommend it. That is, if the court were to engage 
in any conscious or unconscious balancing of values and interests, 
the "benefit" of social class imbalance would be far less likely to 
outweigh the evil of racial imbalance than would, say, issues of 
population density or neighborhood services (sewage, power). More-
over, when plaintiffs' prayers for relief are based on explicitly sin-
gling out various class characteristics as undesirable, the link be-
tween race and class may be seen as more than a matter of hap-
penstance if there is a striking degree of overlap between the two 
categories. 
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2. Special Scrutiny on Non-racial Grounds 
It is also arguable that, racial aspects aside, social class distinc-
tions of the kind and for the purpose employed by the NO-eHA 
plaintiffs should themselves be viewed as suspect, or at least trigger 
scrutiny of a stricter form than the rubber-stamp rationality test. 
While distinctions based on wealth are not invariably held sus-
pect,153 they have been struck down in some instances. In San Anto-
nio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,154 the Supreme Court, 
while upholding a school financing scheme based on local property 
taxes, whose effect was to create wide disparities in educational 
quality, stated that, 
the precedents of this court provide a proper starting point. The individ-
uals or groups of individuals who constituted the class discriminated 
against in our prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: be-
cause of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some 
desired benefit, and, as a consequence, they sustained an absolute dep-
rivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.155 
The applicability of this distinction to the NO-eHA situation is 
unclear. On the one hand, the potential CHA tenants will doubtless 
live somewhere, however substandardly; on the other hand the best 
analog to public school may be not housing per se, but public hous-
ing. 
The NO-eHA defendants maintained that the potential tenants 
met the Rodriguez test, and then some, in that the NO-eHA plain-
tiffs aimed at denying the tenants the right to the benefit (public 
housing) for reasons only marginally related to ability to pay, and 
on the basis of an explicit singling-out of poor people.158 The distinc-
tion between explicit and de facto (buying power) restrictions on the 
poor may be thought sensible. However, the Supreme Court deci-
sion in James v. Valtierra l57 appears to reject the distinction be-
tween singling out the poor explicitly, regardless of their buying 
power, and merely tolerating economic inequalities. Valtierra held 
that a state constitutional provision,158 which required a referendum 
before construction of publically-financed low-income housing, did 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.159 Moreover, the Court so 
held despite the fact that the article did not apply to other govern-
mental projects or other types of government-financed housing,180 
and despite Justice Marshall's protestations that the referendum 
procedure invidiously discriminated against the poor "as such", not 
merely as a neutral effect of buying power. 181 
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However, there are at least two grounds for distinguishing 
Valtierra's findings on the issue of equal protection and wealth from 
the NO-CHA situation. First, the Valtierra Court stressed the fact 
that a referendum was involved, noting the historic role played by 
referenda in the democratic process. 162 True, Section 102(2)(C) 
vaguely resembles the Valtierra referendum article in that one of the 
section's purposes is to encourage public participation in decision-
making. However, EIS-based citizen suits, especially when based 
on a bizarre statutory interpretation which In turn depends on a 
broad generalization as to the relative merits of social classes, 
hardly possess the same historic gloss or democratic appeal as refer-
endum procedures. 
Valtierra and other recent wealth discrimination casesl63 might 
also be distinguished on the ground that classifications based on 
"social class characteristics" are far more serious than classifica-
tions based on wealth alone. Considerations of due process and 
equal protection merge almost completely in the NO-CHA model, 
which combines singling out an oppressed class (equal protection) 
with explicit predictive generalizations concerning the class (due 
process) as the basis for applying a statute in a manner likely to 
adversely affect that class. Although there are (fortunately) no other 
examples, and hence no decisions, on this sort of classificatory-
predictive model, it is suggested that the model should be viewed 
as constitutionally unique and uniquely troubling. 
3. The Rational Basis Approach 
As stated earlier, it appears that the recently discovered 
"trend"164 away from a two-tier equal protection and toward "a more 
flexible and equitable approach"165 has ended. The recent decision 
in Village of Belle Terre u. Boraas not only restates the two-tier 
test,166 but also indicates increasing reluctance to enlarge the inter-
ests or classifications triggering the stricter tier. 167 In Belle Terre, the 
Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance which excluded groups 
of three or more unmarried persons from single-family-zoned neigh-
borhoods, declaring that it would respect legislative classifications 
"if the law be 'reasonable, not arbitrary' . . . and bears a 'rational 
relationship to a permissible state objective'. "168 True to the test of 
rationality, the Court quickly dispensed with the appellee's consti-
tutional arguments after listing a few permissible zoning goals, ap-
parently on the theory that these goals could have been those sought 
by the ordinance's framers. 169 
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The Belle Terre case is troubling not only in its reaffirmation of 
the rationality test, but also in that its fact situation, superficially 
at least, bears analogy to that in NO-CHA. The local zoning power 
to which Belle Terre so summarily defers is of course similar to the 
federal government's power to protect the national environment, 
and the Belle Terre Court defines zoning power broadly: 
it is not confined to the elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy 
places. It is ample to layout zones where family values [and] youth 
values ... make the area a sanctuary for people. '70 
Nevertheless, despite its test, result, and general attitude toward 
innovative equal protection arguments in the housing area, the 
Belle Terre decision should not be viewed as constitutionally coun-
tenancing NO-CHA's application ofNEPA to social class character-
istics. First and most obviously, the homogeneity Belle Terre sanc-
tions is not that of social classes; as noted above, social class and 
the peculiar use NO-CHA makes of it are especially pernicious, even 
if not legally suspect. Second, the Belle Terre Court claims not to 
be countenancing any homogeneity whatever: the Court notes that 
the appellees' grounds for attack include the claim "that social 
homogeneity is not a legitimate interest of government", but states 
that "we find none of these reasons in the record before us". 171 The 
Belle Terre majority might have found such reasons, had it been 
willing to explore the actual purpose and effect of the ordinance in 
greater depth. However, the Court's finding that "social homogene-
ity" (by which it meant homogeneity in lifestyle and household 
compositions) was not in issue, even if based on incorrect factual or 
logical analysis, explicitly distinguishes Belle Terre from a suit 
whose sole basis is social class composition. 
A more general basis for distinguishing Belle Terre from NO-CHA 
lies in the fact that, while numerous governmental goals utterly 
distinct from social exclusivity could be hypothesized as motivating 
(or resulting from) the Belle Terre ordinance, the aim of NO-CHA 
is clearly and exclusively class homogeneity; and the reasons why 
this homogeneity is sought, as well as the alleged effects sought to 
be avoided, are explicitly outlined by the plaintiffs. 
This second distinction points up a major reason why, in the 
writer's opinion, social class characteristics are especially vulnera-
ble to equal protection attack when used in a NEPA-based suit. 
Complainants who urge a novel, debatable statutory interpretation, 
unlike litigants who attempt to enforce or uphold a clear statutory 
mandate, do not have the benefit of judicial presumption of legiti-
mate state goals. 
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In the customary equal protection case, the court has before it a 
statute which clearly mandates the protested result (or a state prac-
tice or statutory application which undoubtedly occurred). The 
Madisonian jurisprudential theory behind the rationality test is pre-
sumably that, absent some trigger of strict scrutiny, the court 
should assume that the legislature or officer acted constitutionally, 
and should seek a legitimate motivation for the statute, application, 
or practice. Indeed, absent statutory provisions, the courts have a 
self-proclaimed duty to avoid constitutional doubts,t72 unnecessary 
constitutional decisions, and hypothetical reasoning. 
A Section 102(2)(C) case based on social class characteristics lies 
somewhere between the extremes described above: a statute is in-
voked, but its mandate to consider social class characteristics, or to 
espouse class homogeneity as a goal, is far from clear. Instead of 
hypothesizing goals justifying an admitted governmental classifica-
tion, the court hearing a suit like NO-CHA must accept and enforce 
the claim that, for various factual (nonhypothetical) reasons, a goal 
and a classification should be seen as statutorily required. Thus, if 
the court in NO-CHA had found that the proposed tenant's "social 
class characteristics" were such as to create a likelihood of, e.g., 
increased crime, (assuming this to be provable) it would then have 
had to ask whether preventing this effect through preventing class 
mixing was an intended goal of NEPA and, if so, whether such a 
goal and such a classification are constitutionally permissible. 
There would be no question of hypothesizing additional reasons 
favoring class homogeneity, since the very reason for invoking Sec-
tion 102 would be the particular harm alleged to result from interfer-
ing with this homogeneity. 
Note also that, once valid doubts as to constitutionality are raised 
by either litigant, courts must go further than mere limitation to 
specifically alleged goals. They must also avoid, wherever possible, 
statutory interpretations or applications which give rise to constitu-
tional doubts. A statute "must be construed with an eye to possible 
constitutional limitations, so as to avoid doubts as to its validity."173 
Thus, in NO-CHA or any future case invoking NEPA in the frontier 
areas of class-based generalization and prediction, the test of ration-
ality should be applied rigorously. 
To wit: the end sought by NO-CHA, social class homogeneity, has 
never expressly been found legitimate, or even permissible; the clos-
est precedent being Valtierra, supra. And even if class homogeneity 
is offered merely as a means of achieving the goals of safety, beauty, 
a healthy moral climate, etc., an EIS outlining competing sociologi-
110 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
cal theories and collecting data on all poor people, or even all Chi-
cago poor people who might be selected for the housing project, is a 
uniquely irrational means of achieving these ends. The only relevant 
data is that which will bear on the characteristics of the tenants of 
the proposed housing, since they and not the poor generally will 
presumably be creating the predicted neighborhood havoc and deg-
radation. Yet these individuals cannot be screened or evaluated 
with reference to a particular neighborhood until housing has been 
built for them and they are selected for it. If housing cannot be built 
until a study is made, then study of the families who will actually 
reside in the housing is impossible.m Unless one assumes that a 
staggering percentage of low-income families possess the alleged 
adverse characteristics-so many that the low income population 
would not contain enough people worthy of filling the available 
slots-or that there is no way to distinguish between potentially 
harmful poor people and other poor people, the statistical EIS route 
makes little sense. 
One of the cases favorably cited by the Belle Terre Court was 
Reed v. Reed, in which the Court struck down a probate rule favor-
ing male over female relatives for estate administration. 175 While 
refusing to declare sex classifications suspect, the Court found the 
Reed classification arbitrary and irrational in that many women did 
not fit the "less businesslike" stereotype imposed on them. 176 Surely 
many poor people (and very surely enough to fill available housing 
slots, after careful tenant selection) do not fit the NO-CHA stereo-
type. Add to this the fact that Reed, unlike NEPA suits based on 
class, involved a regulation whose provisions were clear, thereby 
requiring constitutional decision rather than leaving open the ave-
nue of construction to avoid constitutional doubt,177 and the equal 
protection attack on explicitly exclusionary NEPA suits is compel-
ling. 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen that the use of NEP A to preserve social class homo-
geneity, especially when attempted on the basis of predicted class 
behavior, is subject to attack on many grounds-so many, indeed, 
and so often interrelated, that litigants and theorists may find it 
difficult to isolate and "rank" them. A concluding summary of the 
arguments explored above may be of some help. 
(I) The most obvious general area of limitation is statutory con-
struction. It is arguable (1) that as a matter of statutory construc-
tion NEPA does not encompass social class characteristics; or (2), 
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more narrowly, that even if these characteristics may (or must) be 
considered in the NEPA system for some purposes-perhaps, e.g., 
to foster class heterogeneity-these purposes do not include that of 
preserving existing class composition. (3) Even assuming that 
NEPA standing alone permits or requires the disputed construction, 
such a construction may conflict with other statutes (notably in the 
areas of housing and civil rights) so as to require that NEPA be 
narrowly interpreted in this context or, if a narrow reading is impos-
sible, overridden. 
(II) Whatever NEPA's language or history otherwise requires, 
various evidentiary considerations may defeat claims of the NO-
CHA variety. (4) The simplest argument in litigation is failure of 
proof in the particular case at issue: that the predicted harms have 
not been shown to be so likely as to trigger NEPA. (In most cases 
this argument will be inseparable from questions of statutory inter-
pretation, since the decisionmaker must determine the level of like-
lihood necessary for § 102(2)(C) review.) (5) One may dispute the 
probative reliability of sociological, statistical or predictive evidence 
generally, as well as the truth of the specific allegations and infer-
ences raised. 
Predictive sociological evidence may also be attacked on grounds 
other than lack of probative value. (6) These grounds include spe-
cific considerations of judicial policy, such as that disfavoring char-
acter evidence. (7) Policy questions may become especially compel-
ling as they approach the area of basic jurisprudence: for example, 
the nature of the theories and evidence put forward may conflict 
with the judiciary's view of human beings as unique and self-
determined. 
(III) (8) The breadth, unfairness and irrationality ofthe general-
izations and goals advanced may go beyond the level even of juris-
prudence, and may be so egregious as to violate constitutional due 
process. (9) Lastly, the explicit, and in some cases the implicit (e.g., 
race) classifications drawn may also violate constitutional equal 
protection. 
It is difficult to pick and choose, tactically or analytically, among 
the nine arguments or three general categories listed above. The 
most straight forward method of obtaining dismissal of NO-CHA-
type lawsuits is probably the sweeping statutory interpretation ap-
proach: that changes in class composition are not "environmental" 
effects within § 102(2)(C). Such an approach avoids the logical com-
plexities and tactical pitfalls of constitutional litigation, as well as 
the confusion and ugly, insulting overtones of sociological debate 
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over the relative merits of social classes. However, it would be tacti-
cally unwise to rely solely on NEPA's intended meaning. NO-CHA's 
interpretation of NEPA, though bizarre, is not demonstrably outra-
geous as a matter of history, logic or linguistics; for this reason, 
constitutional and evidentiary defenses should also be raised. 
It is doubtful that any court would reach the constitutional issues 
advanced in this article, because courts will probably take pains to 
avoid reaching them. The canons of avoiding unnecessary constitu-
tional decision and constitutionally doubtful statutory interpreta-
tion (and, perhaps, their psYC;hological analogue, the desire to avoid 
reversal on constitutional grounds) increase the likelihood of a fa-
vorable ruling on construction or evidentiary grounds. 
In any case based on "factual" allegations similar to NO-CHA's, 
evidentiary defenses (specific and general, reliability- and policy-
based) should be raised. Evidentiary considerations may bolster a 
decision based on statutory interpretation; for example, the decision 
that NEPA could· not have been intended to cover harms so un-
likely, causally remote or difficult to measure. Or a court might 
frame its decision in terms of "pure" failure to prove the allegations 
before it. In theory at least, evidentiary insufficiency is the narrow-
est possible holding, one which limits itself to factual questions. 
However, it is hoped that courts-and administrative bodies and 
legislatures, for that matter-will prefer not even to consider the 
truth or falsity of class-based behavioral predictions, but will reject 
both the concept of ranking social classes, and the goal of segregat-
ing these classes, on the ground that debate of this sort runs counter 
to national policy, "environmental" or otherwise. 
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